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The undefined and defined terms, the axioms, and all the theorems that
can be derived from them constitute a theory. (Stigum, 1991, p. 36)
Standard economics rests on a set of behavioral axioms (Arrow and Hahn, 1991, p.
v) which, in an abstract form, rephrase the minimax principle as verbally laid down
by J. S. Mill:
Just in the same manner [as geometry] does Political Economy pre-
suppose an arbitrary definition of man, as a being who invariably does
that by which he may obtain the greatest amount of necessaries, conve-
niences, and luxuries, with the smallest quantity of labour and physical
self-denial with which they can be obtained in the existing state of
knowledge. (Mill, 2004, p. 110)
Mill, though, regarded this behavioral principle as a working hypothesis with limited
applicability:
In political economy for instance, empirical laws of human nature
are tacitly assumed by English thinkers, which are calculated only for
Great Britain and the United States. (Mill, 2006, p. 906)
And Mill never defended the minimax principle as a realistic description of human
behavior, but on methodological grounds.
Not that any political economist was ever so absurd as to suppose that
mankind are really thus constituted, but because this is the mode in
which science must necessarily proceed. (Mill, 2004, p. 106)
Hence any criticism on moral, psychological or sociological grounds remains on the
surface and misses Mill’s intention. But, by the same token, to invest a rather trivial
behavioral hypothesis with the status of an irremovable cornerstone of the whole
theoretical edifice is hardly in accordance with Mill’s understanding of economics
as a scientific endeavor. Value, wealth and the iron laws of distribution were the real
issues of the classics and human behavior was a theoretical sideshow. Somewhere
in the process, though, analytical priorities changed and homo oeconomicus took
over center stage – not to everyone’s satisfaction.
No science has been criticized by its own servants as openly and
constantly as economics. The motives of dissatisfaction are many,
but the most important pertains to the fiction of homo oeconomicus.
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, p. 1)
It is by now well-understood that the homo oeconomicus approach is not unsatisfac-
tory because of one-sidedness or unrealism, as common sense would have it, but
because it cannot work for methodological reasons.
2
The predictive weakness of theories couched in intensional vocabulary
do not correlate in a manageable way with the vocabulary of other
successful scientific theories; they do not divide nature at the joints; ....
(Rosenberg, 1994, p. 224)
To properly divide nature at the joints the subject matter is in the following formally
separated into the structural axiom set and the propensity function. While the
axiomatization of human behavior is in the last instance self-contradictory the
axiomatization of the money economy’s fundamental structure is feasible. Structural
axioms are free of any explicit or implicit behavioral assumptions. This means that
a general formal complement is required that captures human behavior, at least
insofar as it is relevant for the functioning of the economic system. The purpose
of the present paper is to demonstrate how the interaction of structural axiomatic
core and behavioral propensity function produces plausible outcomes in the product
market.
Accordingly the formal frame that constitutes the pure consumption economy is
set up in section 1. In sections 2 and 3 the propensity function is introduced and
related to familiar conceptions. The two components of the propensity function
are direction and magnitude of the rate of change of an elementary axiomatic
variable. The magnitude is left to chance, the direction is determined by the signum
function. The properties of the signum function and the behavioral link between
the information function and the action function are established in sections 4 and 5.
In section 6 the whole formalism is put to work in a simulation. The directedness
that originates from the signum function produces stochastic stability in the product
market. In the structural axiomatic context the argument of the information function
adopts the role of the first derivative. In section 7 the formal conditions of a
general behavioral optimum are defined in structural axiomatic terms. Section 8
summarizes.
1 Axioms
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in
a period of arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is
conveniently assumed to be the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have at
first one world economy, one firm, and one product.
Total income of the household sector Y is the sum of wage income, i.e. the
product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the product
of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
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O = RL |t (2)
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X.
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment
expenditures, no foreign trade, and no taxes or any other government activity.1
The period values of the variables are connected formally by the familiar growth
equation, which is added to the structural set as the fourth axiom:
Zt = Zt−1 (1+
...
Z t) (4)
The path of the representative variable Zt , which stands for the seven elementary
(W, P, R, X, L, D, N,) and the three composed (Y, O, C) axiomatic variables is then
determined by the initial value Z0 and the rates of change
...
Z t for each period:
Zt = Z0 (1+
...
Z 1)(1+
...
Z 2) . . .(1+
...
Z t) = Z0
t
∏
t=1
(1+
...
Z t) (5)
Thus the price in period t, for example, is formally derived from the known price
in period t-1 and the actual price change in period t, which depends in the main
on the decision maker’s objectives, on the subjective interpretations of the actual
situation, on expectations, on opportunities and limits, and on actionability. When
the initial values are determined nothing but the rates of change of the elementary
variables remain as explananda. Thus structural axiomatization is conductive to a
theory of economic change.
2 The propensity function
Axiomatization provides the bare structural bones. The first question is how the
rates of change of the elementary variables are determined. The obvious next step is
to invoke both, purposeful agents and pure randomness, to ‘animate’ (Popper, 1994,
p. 164) the formalized economy. To prepare for a general answer the rate of change
1 “... we shall be concerned with a particular, but very important, class of economic theories, namely
those where the theoretical model consists of a system of (ordinary or functional) equations between
certain economic variables. A few remarks may be made as to the common sense of this type of
economic theory. Broadly speaking, we may classify such quantitative economic relations in the
three groups: I. Definitional identities, II. Technical relations, III. Relations describing economic
action. The first group is exemplified by such relations as: Total expenditure = price multiplied by
quantity bought, total output = output per worker times the number of workers, and similar types of
"bookkeeping identities.” To the second group belong, e.g., technical production functions, and other
natural or institutional restrictions which are usually taken as data in economic planning. In the third
group we find the broad class of relations describing the behavior of individuals or collective units in
their economic activity, their decisions to produce and consume.” (Haavelmo, 1944, pp. 2-3)
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Propensity type State of knowledge Set of possible outcomes
{...Z}
A: Uncertainty a) definitive, i.e. proven by an impossibility
theorem, or, b) contingent, i.e. may be overcome
with better methods or tools
{−100%≤ ...Z < ∞}
P (•) not defined
B: Randomness The set of possible outcomes is inductively
inferred from more or less sophisticated
observations (xB1, xB2, . . .) that display no
dominant influence {...Z}= fB (xB1, xB2, . . .)
e.g. {−3%≤ ...Z ≤ 3%}
P (•) equally distributed
C: Directed
randomness
One conjectures a direction of change {−1,0,1}
and has a hypothesis that explains it in the logical
format if [antecedent] then {−1;0;1};
{...Z}= fC (xC1, xC2, . . .)
e.g.
{−1;0;1}{0%≤ ...Z ≤ 3%}
P (•) equally distributed
D: Dependency One has a sufficiently specified hypothesis about
the influence of the independent variables
(xD1, xD2, . . .): {
...
Z}= fD (xD1, xD2, . . .)
e.g. {7.2%±0,3%}
P =0.99
E. Determinism One has a law and knows the boundary
conditions: {...Z}= fE (xE1, xE2, . . .)
e.g. {7.19470%}
P =1
Figure 1: The propensity function covers five logical types to derive the rates of change of the
axiomatic variables in period t
of the representative variable
...
Z is replaced by a set of possible outcomes {...Z}. Its
rationale is outlined in Figure 1.
Figure 1 is consolidated to the propensity function (6) with
...
Z standing for the
rates of change of the seven elementary variables.2 The propensity function yields a
definite rate of change for each period:
...
Z = {−1,0,1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
direction
P({...Z})︸ ︷︷ ︸
magnitude
|t (6)
The two components of the propensity function are direction and magnitude. In
the limiting case of uncertainty, type-A, the propensity function is not defined. In
the limiting case of determinism, type-E, everything is defined by the magnitude
bracket, the value in the direction bracket is unity by default. At the moment no
deterministic behavioral functions are known in economics. Type-A represents the
status quo, i.e. that we have no a priori knowledge of the set of possible outcomes
or any determinants of (6). To get things going we have to take type-B as the
minimalist starting point of behavioral analysis:
The simplest hypothesis is that variation is random until the contrary
is shown, the onus of the proof resting on the advocate of the more
complicated hypothesis ... . (Kreuzenkamp and McAleer, 1995, p. 12)
2 The term propensity is here used in the sense of (Popper, 1990).
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The magnitude of the rate of change is in the following left to chance. The agents
are supposed to determine the direction of change.
3 The qualitative and separable agent
The direction of action is captured in a general form by a signum function that de-
termines the algebraic sign of the random rate of change of the axiomatic variables:
{−1,0,1}= sgnα (if [A]) |t (7)
The direction is conditional on whether one or more antecedents are satisfied or
not. The antecedent [A] is a shorthand for conditions of any degree of sophistication
expressed by the operators >, <, =, AND, OR etc. and variables with a time index t
or prior. Type-C is the formal container for a familiar conception that Samuelson
identified as ‘qualitative prediction’:
The qualitative predictions that we can test against data are roughly the
signs, positive or negative, of the partial differentials of the changes
in the values of economic variables we set out to measure. . . . In
general, qualitative predictions purport to identify the direction in
which changes move, without, however, identifying the magnitude of
these changes. Of course, as Samuelson notes, we would like to have
more than qualitative predictions . . . . (Rosenberg, 1992, p. 68)
The notion of directionality is by no means new in economics and can be traced
back to J. S. Mill:3
3 “The laws of economics are to be compared with the law of the tides, rather than with the simple and
exact law of gravitation. For the actions of men are so various and uncertain, that the best statement of
tendencies, which we can make in a science of human conduct, must needs be inexact and faulty. This
might be urged as a reason against making any statements at all on the subject; . . . . Thus a law of
social sciences, or a Social Law, is a statement of social tendencies; . . . ” (Marshall, 2009, pp. 26-27),
original emphasis
“Price, and more especially the price of labour, is scarcely ever mentioned without provoking a
reference to the ‘inexorable’, the ‘immutable’, the ‘eternal’ laws by which it is governed; to laws
which, according to my friend Professor Fawcett, are ‘as certain in their operation as those which
control physical nature.’ It is no small gain to have discovered that no such despotic laws do or can
exist; that, inasmuch as the sole function of scientific law is to predict the invariable recurrence of the
same effects from the same causes, and as there can be no invariability where – as in the case of price
– one of the most efficient causes is that ever-changing chameleon, human character or disposition,
price cannot possibly be subjected to law.” (Thornton, 1869, p. 65)
“Gustav Rümelin, in a late essay on laws of history . . . reflected that two decades of intensive
research had yielded nothing that could properly be called a social law. This, he decided, was in
retrospect unsurprising, for psychical phenomena are wholly unlike physical, and there is no reason
to think the same concept of law applies to each. . . . Wilhelm Wundt, similarly, emphasized the
relation between intentionally and directionality in arguing for a category of psychical causality that
is nondeterministic.” (Gingerezer et al., 1997, p. 64)
“According to Schmoller, it was wrong to derive economic laws of nature from human rules of
behavior and to speak of a natural economic order.” (Klant, 1988, p. 97)
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Doubtless, a man often asserts of an entire class what is only true of
a part of it; but his error generally consists not of making too wide an
assertion, but in making the wrong kind of assertion: he predicated an
actual result, when he should only have predicated a tendency to the
result – a power acting with certain intensity in that direction. (Mill,
2004, p. 123), original emphasis
Type-C does exactly this: it predicates a behavioral tendency or, more specific, a
conditional direction of action.
It is important to note that the axiomatic core is not affected when a specific
behavioral hypothesis, which is embodied in the propensity function, is falsified.
One of the outstanding characteristics of the structural axiomatic approach is the
separability of the behavioral and non-behavioral fundamentals. This carries with
it the option to employ neoclassical or Keynesian or evolutionary behavioral as-
sumptions within one formal framework (cf. Foster, 2005, p. 378). Because it is
compatible with any behavioral assumption the structural axiom set is intrinsically
general. This generality frees theoretical economics from the necessity to reiterate
unpersuasive and in part already empirically refuted behavioral assumptions just
because they are irremovable cornerstones of the formal edifice (Boland, 1981).
The magnitude of the rate of change depends on the inductively inferred prob-
ability distribution and one has no a priori reason to assume either a discrete or
a continuous random variable or a specific distribution. Therefore, the uniform
discrete distributions in Figure 1 have to be taken as a pragmatic point of departure
which in no way prevents the eventual introduction of, for example, a Gauss distri-
bution. This, however, is not only a purely technical matter but touches on some
dodgy methodological points that need not concern us here (Mirowski, 2004a, pp.
233-241). The propensity function (6) is a comprehensive blank form open to pro-
gressive specification. It demands no ontological commitment to either determinism
or indeterminism (cf. Peirce, 1992).
In its general form the propensity function asserts that the directed rates of
change
...
Z , i.e. the bounded change vectors, are to different degrees dependent on the
state of the world at the beginning of period t or earlier. This state is characterized by
the difference between the agent’s actual condition Z and appropriate objectives or,
more general, reference values Zθ of different kinds. The explicit signum function
that determines the direction of action has in turn two parts and reads:
{−1,0,1}= sgnα
(
sgnβ
(
Z−Zθ
))
|t (8)
The reference value may, for example, be the profit maximum given the actual
state of expectations. The underlying intuition of (8) is well-understood since the
classics:
“But, it will be said, the existence of trends or tendencies in social change can hardly be questioned:
every statistician can calculate such trends. Are these trends not comparable with Newton’s law of
inertia? The answer is: trends exist, or more precisely the assumptions of trends is often a useful
statistical device. But trends are not laws.” (Popper, 1960, p. 115), original emphasis
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According to Wicksell’s hypothesis the course of prices is governed by
the difference i-r. Wicksell’s approach has a highly classical ancestry.
Malthus explained the rate of population growth by the difference
between the actual wage and the zero growth wage. Ricardo explained
capital accumulation by the difference between the actual profit rate
and the zero-saving profit rate. Even the application to money was
anticipated by Henry Thornton . . . . (Niehans, 1994, p. 255)
In sum, the propensity function satisfies the demand for a general formalism to
represent economic man/woman.
Briefly put, we should expect a conceptual framework that would
facilitate the creation of theories or models that contain manipula-
ble variables whose dosages can be raised sufficiently to swamp the
environmental effects and sufficiently to obtain accurate directional
predictions for a limited period of time. (Leibenstein, 1980, pp. 25-26)
It is worth emphasizing that (8) is purely formal and does not contain more philoso-
phy, sociology or psychology than that human behavior is directed.4 We have now
to determine in more detail how this works.
4 The information and the action function
Economic man/woman in the structural axiomatic context at first chooses an infor-
mation source and this entails that there is more than one available. It is assumed
here that the set of information sources is restricted to the variables of the axiom set.
The information function contains two variables: the realized value Z of the chosen
variable and the reference value Zθ .
The reference value can be taken as the concrete result of an optimization
procedure, such that the value of Zθ in period t is the subjectively most preferred
among all other possible values given the subjective knowledge of the situation in
period t and given the actual expectations. The reference value, however, has a
wider meaning as we shall see in the following. We refrain here from speculating
about what goes on in the head of an agent and treat the reference value as open
interface to any promising behavioral approach that is capable of providing the
value. Correspondingly we have at the moment no indication of how alterations of
the reference value are brought about. It is assumed in the interim that it follows
a type-B random path. The information function that yields one of three possible
values is specified as:
{−1,0,1}= sgnβ
(
Z−Zθ
)
|t (9)
4 “Now the rationality principle, which in the social sciences plays a role somewhat analogous to the
universal laws of the natural sciences, is false, and if in addition the situational models are also false,
then both the constituent elements of social theory are false.” (Popper, 1994, p. 173)
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It is certainly not the case that real world agents expect that the actual value
of a variable is exactly equal to the corresponding reference value and that they
immediately react to the smallest deviation. On the contrary, infinitesimal precision,
which is an implicit property of standard equilibrium models, has to be rejected
as an inadmissible idealization.5 Every action entails set-up costs and therefore
inertia.6 To explicitly account for the inexactitude of the information function the
notion of inertia is introduced with the parameter i:
{−1,0,1}= sgnβ
(
Z−
(
Zθ ± ι
))
|t (10)
Since only the sign of the difference of the realized value Z and the reference
value Zθ is of interest there is no urgent need for economic man/woman to measure
these values with high precision. All that is needed is that economic man/woman
can ascertain one of the relations: greater, smaller, or roughly equal (cf. March and
Simon, 1958, pp. 137-142). So measurement errors or a rule of thumb attitude does
not impair the functioning of (10) which fits Bateson’s well-known definition of
information as ‘a difference that makes a difference’.
In a random environment it makes good economic sense not to react to small
changes and deviations because it is to be expected that they, more often than not,
cancel out in the following periods. The magnitude of the inertia parameter in
(10) therefore determines the sensitivity of the whole system. In order to keep
the following signum functions legible the inertia parameter is omitted with the
understanding that it normally has a value greater than zero.
Next, economic man/woman has to choose an action variable. It is assumed that
the set of action variables consists of the variables of the axiom set. The subsets,
however, are different for the business and the household sector. The quantity
bought X belongs to the households’s subset but not the firms’s. The action variable
is dependent upon the output of the information function. The direction for the
random rate of change of the action variable X is then given by:
{−1,0,1}= sgnX
(
sgnβ
(
Z−Zθ
))
|t (11)
The sign of the rate of change of the action variable depends on the sign that is
provided by the information function. We thus have nine combinatorial variants of
the relations between information and action as exhibited in Figure 2.
From the nine possible combinations four are singled out as momentarily not
feasible. The agent is not allowed not to act (anf, cnf) and he is only allowed to
5 “Because of its superficial facility of measurement, economics has allowed its modes of thought to
become in some degree divorced from its subject-matter. It has tried for a precision, certainty and
reach of prediction whose basis is not there.” (Shackle, 1972, pp. 361-362)
6 “The inert area concept is related to human inertia. A very broad concept of utility cost is envisioned
in which the elements that contribute to inertia are an indifference range between effort utilities, an
insensitivity range, the uncertainty of the utility of a new point over the existing one, as well as over
its “effortfulness,” exaggerated assessments of the temporary cost of moving, the fear of newness, and
fear of disappointment, and so on.” (Leibenstein, 1980, p. 112)
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{−1,0,1}= sgnα︸ ︷︷ ︸
action
(
sgnβ
(
Z−Zθ
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
in f ormation
output information function
input action function
-1 0 1
output -1 a1 bnf c1
action 0 anf b2 cnf
function 1 a3 bnf c3
Figure 2: The general signum function as product of the information and action function
act with a good reason, that is, he is not allowed to act spontaneously (bnf). For a
plus or minus input from the information function economic man/woman has to
choose between two possibilities (a1, a3 respectively c1, c3). For a zero input, i.e.
the realized value is equal to the reference value, no action results (b2).
If the information function refers, for example, to the stock of final products O¯
and if the price P has been chosen as action variable (instead of, say, employment)
and the output of the information function is a plus, i.e. O¯ > O¯θ , then the firm has
to choose either a price increase (a3) or a price reduction (a1). This is an ordinal
choice and it is understood that the agent believes that his action will bring him
closer to the reference value, that is, from worse off to better off (cf. von Mises,
2006, pp. 39-40). Of course we do not know which of the alternatives the firm will
choose. Because of this, the missing behavioral link is amended by the standard
assumption that the firm will lower the price in order to sell off. The magnitude of
the price cut is left to chance.
Even if the signum function is – from the perspective of an outside observer – in
principle correctly specified there is, because of other influences, no guarantee that
the price cut will bring the stock of products closer to the reference value in period
t. The signum function is not an unfailing formula for success but one element in a
trial and error process with practically unpredictable effects on the agent’s operating
experience and expectations. We arrive here at an open interface to a theory of
learning (Dosi et al., 2005), (Boland, 2003, pp. 271-274).
To clarify the formal relationships is one thing, to find the right behavioral link
between the information and the action function is quite another. For the outcome
of the action function in each period we have three values {-1, 0, 1} with zero as
the most probable outcome in the case of inertia. Assumed that the probabilities
for inaction or for a plus or a minus change are all equal then a random guess will
deliver the right prediction with a 33 percent probability. This, then, would be the
rule of thumb benchmark for one period which a qualitative behavioral prediction
must outperform (cf. Rosenberg, 1989). The signum function is a blank form for
behavioral assumptions. Clearly, the new economic man/woman is more versatile
than the single-minded homo economicus.
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5 Properties of the behavioral link
The signum function establishes a link between hitherto independent variables and
thus intensifies the systemic interdependencies that are given with the structural
axiom set. Its formal constituents are the realized and the reference value of a
chosen variable, the information function, the action function, and the resulting
direction of change.
The signum function is also the logical interface between the structural axiomatic
approach and the ‘leading principle of folk psychology’ that more often than not
provides the explanatory link between desires, beliefs, and action in the social
sciences. This link can be stated in one sentence [L]:
Something like the following oversimplified general statement seems
to lie behind our ordinary explanation of human action, our predictions
about how people will behave in the future, and explanations in social
science that trade on folk psychology:
[L] If any agent, x, wants d, and x believes that a is a means to attain d
under the circumstances, then x does a. . . .
For it is [L] that connects the environment to our actions via the desires
and beliefs the environment fosters in us. . . . Economic theory and
parts of political science employ a formal theory of rational choice. But,
as we shall see, rational choice theory is folk psychology formalized.
(Rosenberg, 2008, pp. 34-35, 80)
It needs only a slight reformulation of [L], i.e. the substitution of d by Z−Zθ = 0, to
see that the leading principle of folk psychology is formally embodied as a limiting
case in the signum function.
An outside observer can only observe the realized value of the chosen variable
and the direction of change. The rest of the signum function is a black box and
the gap between the two observables has to be interpolated by assumptions. An
alternative to this theoretical approach is to shortcut the signum function and to
poll the agents at the beginning of the period about the direction and magnitude of
the variable in question (Koopmans, 1957, p. 206) and to feed the results into a
simulation. For practical purposes the first thing to find out is how the agents will
act and not to understand why.
Since the axioms refer to a finite period length the action that follows from
the signum function has to take place at the beginning of period t. From the
methodological point of view an inquiry that starts with a finite period length has
a broader scope because it entails continuous time as limiting case (for details see
2011c, pp. 11-12).
The signum function reflects the lumpiness of the real world. The smooth
variations of quantities in dependence of smooth variations of prices, which is
an defining property of standard equilibrium models, has to be rejected as an
inadmissible idealization. Being eliminative, instead of merely being neglective
(Klant, 1988, p. 90), (Boland, 2003, pp. 79-80), it idealizes away discreteness and
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fuzziness which are the very elements of economic reality the agents have to cope
with. As Popper put it:
. . . the following maxim holds for all sciences: Never aim at more
precision than is required by the problem at hand. (Popper, 1983,
quoted in Redman, 1993, p. 105)
6 Stochastic stability
Being equipped with the propensity function economic man/woman is now left on
his/her own in the drifting economy (for details about the pure random economy see
2011b). The household- and the business sector have different sets of variables to
act upon. From their respective subsets of elementary variables the household sector
is supposed to choose the quantity bought X as action variable and the business
sector price P.
By stipulating that the sign of the random price change is negative if the stock
of products O¯ is above the firm’s reference value O¯θ , and vice versa, we provide
the missing link in the signum function. The signum function is assumed to be
independent and identical in each period. This assumption is not a mere technicality.
Implicitly it precludes memory and learning and makes that the stipulation invariably
holds for all periods, that is, the assumed behavior transmutes into a routine (Nelson
and Winter, 1982, pp. 14-19). Thus the firm adapts the price according to a simple
rule and is not a price-taker. There is no convincing reason to adopt this central
behavioral tenet of standard economics (Eichner, 1983, p. 213). Prices are changed
by real people and not by occult market forces. As Arrow pointed out many years
ago ‘perfect competition and prices changing by the decision of actual agents cannot
be reconciled’ (Hahn, 1984, p. 186). Hence the standard and the structural approach
are irreconcilable exactly at this point. The signum function for the price change in
period t is given by:
−1t = sgnP
(
sgnβ
(
O¯t−1− O¯θt−1
))
(12)
Of course, there is virtually no upper limit for more sophisticated stipulations.
Somewhat more differentiated the household sector acts upon X to price and income
changes and to the difference of the actual stock of money and the reference value.
The rate of change of the quantity bought is negative if the price P increases, positive
if income Y increases, positive if the household sector’s stock of money M¯ is above
the reference value. Hence we have three signum functions with a combined effect
on the quantity bought X. Note that the reference value M¯θt−1 is absolute, i.e. an
objective, and the reference values Pt−1 and Yt−1 are relative:
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−1t = sgnX
(
sgnβ (Pt −Pt−1)
)
1t = sgnX
(
sgnβ (Yt −Yt−1)
)
1t = sgnX
(
sgnβ
(
M¯t−1− M¯θt−1
)) (13)
After applying the propensity function to each element of (13) the resulting
random rate of change of the quantity bought
...
X is given by:
...
X =±...X 1±
...
X 2±
...
X 3 (14)
The signum functions incorporate factual behavioral stipulations without refer-
ence to a preference order (but see J. S. Mill for the ‘composition of causes’ 2006,
p. 371). The behavioral stipulations reiterate in this first round the conventional
commonplace assumptions. The arguments of equation (13) are familiar from the
standard demand schedule. It is important to note, however, that with equation (14)
the quantity bought in period t is determined and nothing else. No attempt is made
to speculate about which quantity the households would buy if the price were higher
or lower. The conceptual and logical problems of notional demand functions are
well known (Mirowski, 2004b, pp. 329-334), (Vickers, 1995, pp. 110-116).
A simulation makes every single action following from (12) and (13) visible
(see Appendix). The example in Figure 3 shows that the two type-C propensity
functions are sufficient to bring both stocks in a random environment repeatedly
back to their reference values, which at first remain unchanged. The system is
stable – at least over the observed time span – irrespective of persistent random
perturbations of all other variables.
The two reference values O¯θ and M¯θ are reached in different periods. It can
be said, then, that the product market is cleared momentarily in period t, i.e. all
previous changes of the stock of products cancel out, and that the household sector’s
budget is momentarily balanced in period t±x, i.e. all previous changes of the
stock of money cancel out. But there is no such thing as a simultaneous behavioral
equilibrium.7
The whole process, the random changes of productivity, employment, wage rate
etc. in combination with the household- and business sector’s actions, which follow
from their respective signum functions, produce the familiar negatively sloped
price-quantity relation in the product market as shown in Figure 3c. This relation
looks like the law of demand but it is obvious that each dot represents one realized
price–quantity configuration while the law of demand states a hypothetical ceteris
paribus relation for the household sector’s demand in one period.
7 “Just as classical General Equilibrium Theory has never been able to provide a definitive account of
how equilibrium prices come to be established, so Rational Expectation Theory has not shown how,
starting from relative ignorance, everything that can be learned comes to be learned.” (Hahn, 1980, p.
133)
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Simultaneity is not a necessary condition for the proper functioning of the
economy. All that is needed is market clearing and budget balancing within a time
span the agents can cope with. Being no feature of the real world simultaneity has to
be regarded as the inoperative artifact of an awkward modeling strategy (Backhouse,
2007, p. 156).
Pure or directed stochastic processes are by their very nature unpredictable.
Observations over longer time spans may therefore stumble across a configuration
of random changes that carry the economy beyond a boundary. We could try to
devise more sophisticated signum functions to account for all kinds of contingencies;
this, indeed, would amount to endowing the agents with faculties they might not
possess. Or we can decide not to be too much irritated by eventual casualties. After
all, bankruptcies and market crashes happen and economic theory has to account
for it.8
Arrow and Hahn have posed the fundamental question that theoretical economics
has to answer: “What will an economy motivated by individual greed and controlled
by a very large number of different agents look like?” (1991, p. vii). The tentative
answer is: somehow like Figure 3,9 with the annotation that greed is not the same
thing as Adam Smith’s notion of self-love (Smith, 2008, p. 22) or self-interest.
This semantic shift, to the contrary, indicates that the genealogical claim ‘that
Smith was a creator of general equilibrium theory’ (Arrow and Hahn, 1991, p.
3) is vacuous.10 It would be more in accordance with historical fact to bestow
Adam Smith in retrospect with the honor of having been the creator of behavioral
economics (Ashraf et al., 2005). General equilibrium theory is as far away from
Adam Smith as it is from reality.
Randomness relativizes the distinction between rational and irrational actions
because the outcome depends not only on the complementary behavior of other
agents and may result in a folie à deux but also on coincidental random changes in
the economic surround. Adam Smith was well aware of this.11 It is important to
remember that Figure 3 depicts a simulation with arbitrarily fixed absolute reference
values. This, of course, is a first round simplification. As a matter of fact these
reference values, too, alternate from period to period thus amplifying or damping
the agents’s actions. In comparison to standard economics it is important to point
out that the agents’s behavior depends on cumulated residuals (Clower, 1966, p.
114), that is, on the actual history of the system (for details see 2011a).
8 “However, case studies of entrepreneurial failures are infrequent, even though it seems likely that
many, perhaps even most entrepreneurial ventures are unsuccessful.” (Rosen, 1997, p. 149)
9 “Hahn . . . has defended the Arrow-Debreu theorems on the grounds that, though they describe no
feasible real-world economy, they show ‘what the world would have to look like’ if the invisible hand
were to operate properly. This claim is nonsense . . . .” (Backhouse, 1998, p. 1853)
10 “Smith never proclaimed in favor of ‘selfishness’, . . . an attribute of Bernard Mandeville’s
philosophy . . . , which Smith regarded as ‘licentious’ . . . .” (Kennedy, 2009, p. 251)
11 “Smith turns from these self-deceptions to the role that the striving in pursuit of such mirages means
for society. For society’s sake, he assures us, it is well that these ‘deceptions’ are widespread because
‘this deception rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind’” (Kennedy, 2009, p.
247), original emphasis
15
7 General stochastic and deterministic optimality
There is at first sight nothing in Figure 3 that resembles the notion of a marginalistic
behavioral equilibrium. This could not be otherwise. The vision of a system heading
towards equilibrium is not an a priori in the structural axiomatic context. This does
not preclude that it is an a posteriori with some best-of-all-worlds properties. As
Bertalanffy noted with regard to General Systems Theory:
Already Maupertuis considered his minimum principle as proof that
the world, where among many virtual movements the one leading to
maximum effect with minimum effort is realized, is the “best of all
worlds” and work of a purposeful creator. Euler made a similar remark:
“Since the construction of the whole world is the most eminent and
since it originated from the wisest creator, nothing is found in the
world which would not show a maximum or minimum characteristic.”
... The conceptual error of an anthropomorphic interpretation is easily
seen. The principle of minimum action and related principles simply
result from the fact that, if the system reaches a state of equilibrium,
the derivatives become zero; this implies that certain variables reach
an extremum, minimum or maximum; . . . (von Bertalanffy, 1969, pp.
75-76)
General equilibrium theory is the worldly echo of Maupertuis and Euler (Nelson,
2006). Having learned from Laplace that he/she was outdated as a hypothesis,
the wisest creator returned as invisible hand of the market ratifying Euler’s claim
that there is nothing in the world, which would not show a maximum or minimum
characteristic. However, physics went on:
Although the law of least action has thus attained a rank among the
highest theorems of physics, yet its pretensions to a cosmological
necessity, on the grounds of the economy in the universe, are now
generally rejected. (Hamilton 1833, quoted in Kline, 1982, p. 73)
Since then the former cosmic economy gained a new lease of life on the microeco-
nomic scale as constrained minimum or maximum.
There is nothing obvious about the definition of human rationality as the
maximization of an objective function over a conserved entity. . . . In its
evolution from Maupertuis to Euler to Hamilton, the principle of least
(or varying) action shed its theological skin, but the notion of absolute
efficiency persisted, and it was this connotation that was recruited to
tame the multiform and unruly concept of rationality. (Mirowski, 1988,
p. 152)
The salient point of maximization as a behavioral assumption is not the lack of
realism but, more serious, that welfare theorems which rely on the minimax principle
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and general equilibrium cannot be taken as a property of the competitive system but
as ‘an anthropomorphic interpretation’ of the mathematical triviality that derivatives
are zero in equilibrium.
Being just a formal implication of equilibrium, optimality is by logical necessity
an implicit property of the type-C process of directed randomness. In a stochastic
world we are entitled to describe the stable meandering around the reference value
over a given time span as stochastic behavioral optimum. This granted we can infer
from the results of the simulation as reported in Figure 3 that both sectors realize at
the best under the given conditions their planned stocks in the type-C process of
interdependent adaption that is governed by their respective signum functions.
Yet we can even go one step further. In the structural axiomatic context the
argument of the information function adopts the role of the first derivative (cf.
Frisch, 1936, 101). The formal criterion of a behavioral optimum is that the value
of the respective information function is zero. In this case no further adaptive action
results. The formal properties of the first and second derivative are well-known and
have to be applied analogously. A general behavioral optimum is attained if all
signum functions realize in the same period the configuration b2 in Figure 2. In this
case the system becomes stationary. This, though, is somewhat improbable.
Within the structural axiomatic framework a general behavioral optimum can
be defined with absolute formal precision, which, to be sure, does not entail that
this interesting analytical limiting case will ever be observed in the real world.
It is worth emphasizing that the formal criterion of a behavioral optimum is
generally applicable, that is, it does not presuppose decreasing marginal productivity,
convex indifference sets or the perfect independence of the individual decision
maker. These are formal requirements of the standard optimization calculus that
are illegitimately imposed upon reality in order to secure the applicability of the
chosen tool.12 The applicability of the propensity function does not depend on
these idiosyncratic restrictions. The propensity function works with all roughly
quantifiable objectives in all possible economic worlds.
8 Summary
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
12 “There are two basic interpretations of the maximization postulate, a “factual” interpretation and
a “tautological” one. ... The essential argument of the tautological interpreter is that an individual
always maximizes, although all the objectives may not be immediately apparent. No criticism of
this view of the maximization postulate is possible. By the same token a nonmaximization postulate
cannot make sense. We should note that this approach not only deflects criticism from maximization
but also from more complicated arguments that include the postulate. It can always be argued that
one has not accurately specified the objective function. This approach makes almost all deductions
based on conventional microeconomics into elusive targets.” (Leibenstein, 1980, pp. v-vi), original
emphasis
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The present paper submits four non-behavioral axioms as groundwork for the
theoretical reconstruction of the evolving money economy. To formally capture
human behavior, that is, to determine the direction of action, the axiom set is
complemented by the propensity function.
The propensity function is a compact formal expression of random, semi-
random, and deterministic behavioral assumptions (type-A to type-E). Thus the
structural axiomatic core and the behavioral propensity function constitute the
formal building blocks of any structural axiomatic model.
The two components of the propensity function are direction and magnitude of
the rate of change of an elementary axiomatic variable. The magnitude is left to
chance, the direction is determined by the signum function.
Economic man/woman is formally portrayed as a bundle of signum functions.
The signum function is in turn the product of the information and the action function.
The information function refers to the difference between the agent’s actual and
desired state. The agent’s decision constitutes the behavioral link between the output
of the information function and the output of the action function, that is, the course
of action.
As a constituent of the propensity function the signum function determines the
direction of change. The information function as a constituent of the signum function
takes the role of the first derivative; a value of zero indicates in the axiomatic context
a behavioral optimum.
The directedness that originates from the signum function produces stochastic
stability and optimality out of randomness and keeps the economy within viable
boundaries for a reasonable time span. Two type-C propensity functions – one for
the business- and one for the household sector – are sufficient to clear the product
market and to balance the household sector’s budget momentarily at different
points in time. This structural axiomatic account of market coordination precludes
the fictitious notion of a simultaneous marginalistic equilibrium. The propensity
function works with all roughly quantifiable objectives in all possible economic
worlds.
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Appendix: Simulation
Download-Link for the Excel File
https://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0B57dPq2RYclpZTEzYzNkMzEtYzllOC00MzU5LThhNWItZTc3NTJhYjljMDUw&hl=
en_US
Worksheet Sections
(A) Data input (in green cells),
(B)(C) Structural axioms,
(D) Residuals and stocks,
(E) Reference values,
(F) Key ratios and checks,
(G) Data for diagrams.
The prepared graphics display more details of the system’s interdependencies in
addition to the diagrams presented in the text.
Technical Annotations
• The initial values of the variables are chosen for modeling purposes and do
not represent any concrete economy. These numbers can be changed at will.
• The range of the random rates of change is set in column D and E (= set of
possible outcomes).
• After changing the parameters press F9 for recalculation.
• If a graphic looks implausible check input data first.
• Changes may be set to zero after an arbitrary period in column F (= until
period) for each variable separately. The default value is 1.000 periods.
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• By making both values of the set of possible outcomes equal, random varia-
tions are excluded and the system becomes deterministic.
• The default propensity in column G is type-B, i.e. all changes are random.
When changing from type-B to type-C in column G the respective column-D
value has to be set to 0 (and vice versa at reset to type-B). Since the algebraic
sign of the respective variable is set according to a specified condition only
the positive values of the rate of change are needed.
• Unforeseeable parameter constellations or combinations of random changes
may lead to surprising results. These are the interesting cases if the effect
persists after multiple recalculations.
• Negative values of the stock of products are not excluded here. They are
regarded as virtual and can always be avoided by introducing an additional
constraint or by an appropriate initial stock.
• Row 23 (t=1) contains all formulas, that is, the logic of the system. This row
is simply copied downward for an arbitrary number of periods.
• For full transparency and to avoid lengthy formulas each step of a calculation
is carried out in a new column.
• B-rate of change means that negative values of the rate of change are trans-
formed in order to get an unbiased process.
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